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NOTES
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
OF TIME-BARRED CLAIMS
Danielle Calamari*
Both state and federal courts have procedural rules that allow a plaintiff
to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice and then to refile it within
the applicable statute-of-limitations period. However, a plaintiff’s right to
this procedural avenue is not absolute, and courts maintain broad
discretion in deciding whether to dismiss a claim with or without prejudice.
If a court allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a time-barred claim
without prejudice, the plaintiff may be able to refile the claim in a
jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations. As a result, the defendant
loses the ability to assert a statute-of-limitations defense in subsequent
litigation. Courts disagree about whether the defendant’s loss of a statuteof-limitations defense constitutes “clear legal prejudice” sufficient to bar
voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
This Note explores this disagreement. First, it examines the two ways
courts currently decide motions for voluntary dismissal of time-barred
claims. Next, it argues that both approaches overlook a fundamental
factor: res judicata (claim preclusion). Specifically, courts do not consider
that statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive in every
jurisdiction. To account for the differences in preclusion law, this Note
proposes that, as a threshold inquiry, courts should determine what the
claim-preclusive effect of a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be.
Based on this determination, a court can decide whether the loss of a
statute-of-limitations defense results in “clear legal prejudice” to the
defendant and whether a dismissal without prejudice is warranted.
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INTRODUCTION
When a plaintiff files a lawsuit in a jurisdiction where the applicable
statute of limitations has expired, the case is not necessarily over. The
plaintiff may be able to voluntarily dismiss the action and then refile it in a
jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.1 Courts have broad
discretion to dismiss an action with or without prejudice.2 A plaintiff can
only refile a claim in another jurisdiction if the court dismisses the first
claim without prejudice.3 Courts generally will allow a plaintiff to dismiss
a claim without prejudice so long as the defendant will not suffer “clear
legal prejudice” as a result.4
If a plaintiff’s claim is time barred and a court dismisses it without
prejudice, the defendant loses the ability to assert a statute-of-limitations
defense in a subsequent lawsuit in another jurisdiction.5 Courts disagree
about whether a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a); infra note 67 and accompanying text.
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); see also, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262–63 (8th Cir. 1993).
3. See infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262; see also infra Part I.B.
5. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262–63.
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constitutes clear legal prejudice to the defendant.6 For this reason, courts
are similarly divided on whether to allow a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a
time-barred claim without prejudice.7
Defendants vigorously oppose plaintiffs’ use of voluntary dismissal to
save time-barred claims. Instead, they typically ask courts to dismiss the
claim with prejudice or on statute-of-limitations grounds.8 A defendant’s
goal through either procedure is to achieve finality through res judicata9—
i.e., a final judgment on the merits that precludes the plaintiff from refiling
the same claim against the defendant in a subsequent lawsuit.10 A
plaintiff’s goal is precisely the opposite. A plaintiff wants the claim
dismissed without prejudice so she can refile it in another jurisdiction with
a longer statute of limitations.11
There are two dominant approaches to resolving these competing
interests. Some courts apply a bright-line rule that a plaintiff may not
voluntarily dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice and refile it in
another jurisdiction.12 Under this approach, a defendant’s loss of a statuteof-limitations defense constitutes “per se legal prejudice” sufficient to bar
voluntary dismissal without prejudice.13 Other courts apply a balancing test
and purport to consider the defendant’s loss of the statute-of-limitations
defense as one of many factors.14
This Note assesses how courts analyze voluntary dismissals of timebarred claims. It considers whether courts should allow a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice and then refile it
in a jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations. It concludes that the
answer is “sometimes” and that courts should analyze this question as a
claim-preclusion problem to determine when dismissal without prejudice is
warranted and when it is not.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the voluntary
dismissal rule and statutes of limitations. Part II analyzes the two
approaches courts use to decide motions for voluntary dismissal of timebarred claims. Finally, Part III argues that the current approaches are
flawed because neither accounts for the fact that statute-of-limitations
dismissals are not always claim preclusive. Consequently, courts reach
inefficient and misleading results. To resolve this issue, this Note proposes
that, as a threshold inquiry, courts should determine what the claimpreclusive effect of a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be. Based on

6. See, e.g., Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting
disagreement among courts).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., id. at 1266; Metro Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 793 F.
Supp 205, 206 (D. Minn. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 1257.
9. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262.
10. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
11. See, e.g., id.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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the answer, a court can determine whether a bright-line rule or a balancing
test is appropriate in that jurisdiction.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Understanding this issue requires basic background knowledge on
voluntary dismissal and statutes of limitations. Part I.A provides an
overview of the voluntary dismissal rule. Next, Part I.B discusses the legal
standard courts apply in deciding motions for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice. Part I.C then turns to an overview of the purpose and policy
behind statutes of limitations. Part I.D concludes with a discussion of the
choice-of-law rules that determine which statute of limitations governs a
particular claim.
A. An Overview of Voluntary Dismissal
When a plaintiff chooses to dismiss a lawsuit, the court has broad
discretion to dismiss the claim(s) either with or without prejudice.15 A
dismissal with prejudice bars the plaintiff from bringing the same claim in a
subsequent lawsuit.16 A dismissal without prejudice puts the plaintiff in the
same legal position as if she never filed the action.17 The plaintiff may thus
refile the same lawsuit within the applicable statute-of-limitations period.18
At common law, a plaintiff had an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss a
claim without prejudice any time prior to judgment or verdict.19 Courts
developed this rule to protect plaintiffs from losing meritorious claims on
technical grounds under the strict common law pleading regime.20 There
was, however, an important limitation on this absolute right: a plaintiff
could not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice when doing so
would be “manifestly prejudicial” to the defendant.21 Courts found such
prejudice in cases where a defendant was reasonably entitled to a judgment
on the merits, or when a defendant sought affirmative relief and a dismissal
would bar the defendant’s pending counterclaim or cross-claim.22

15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (“Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal under
this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.”); see also, e.g., Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262,
1268 (11th Cir. 2015).
16. E.g., Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955); Nemaizer v.
Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986).
17. E.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976).
18. See id.
19. In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 92–93 (1924).
20. See Note, Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule 41(a): The Disappearing Right of
Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YALE L.J. 738, 738 (1954). This rule reflected the notion that a
plaintiff was the “master of his case until a judgment was rendered.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 463 (5th ed. 2015).
21. See Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Cent. Transp. Co., 171 U.S. 138, 146 (1898).
22. See, e.g., id.
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The enactment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) and comparable
state rules23 significantly limited a plaintiff’s absolute right to voluntarily
dismiss a claim without prejudice. Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice at any time before the
defendant serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment.24 While
Rule 41(a)(1) appears to preserves a plaintiff’s absolute right, it limits that
right to a relatively early stage in the litigation.25 After a defendant has
served an answer or a motion for summary judgment, Rule 41(a)(2) allows
a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice only by court
order and on conditions the court deems fair.26 Unlike a dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(1), a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) requires the plaintiff to file a
motion and allows the court to attach conditions to the dismissal order.27
Courts have broad discretion in crafting Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal
conditions.28 For example, courts have conditioned dismissals without
prejudice on the plaintiff’s payment of the defendant’s attorney’s costs and
fees from the first litigation,29 refiling a subsequent action in a particular
forum,30 excluding a particular claim from a future complaint,31 and
producing existing discovery in a subsequent action on the same claim.32 If
a plaintiff fails to comply with the conditions, she may not refile the
claim.33

23. A majority of state courts have adopted versions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a). See Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 36
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, app. at 406–18 (2003) (surveying the fifty states’ voluntary
dismissal rules and statutes). Seventeen states still follow some version of the common law
rule. Id.
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); see also, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (2016); MASS. R.
CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (2016); UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (2016).
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); see also Marques v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 286 F.3d 1014,
1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases interpreting Rule 41(a)(1) as giving the plaintiff an
absolute right to voluntarily dismiss an action before a defendant serves an answer or a
motion for summary judgment); In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d
213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977).
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); see also, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (2016); COLO.
R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (2016); KY. R. CIV. P. 41.02 (2016).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 29–33.
28. See, e.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. See, e.g., Marlow v. Winston & Strawn, 19 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that an award of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred during the first litigation is an
appropriate condition to dismissal without prejudice); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d
855, 859–60 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Costs may include all litigation-related expenses incurred by
the defendant, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”).
30. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Sapulpa v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1413
(10th Cir. 1991).
31. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-4217-NKL, 2011 WL
6339830, at *2–3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2011) (allowing the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his
action without prejudice on the condition that he does not include a federal discrimination
claim in a subsequent complaint).
32. See, e.g., Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 10-1085 “G”(1), 2012 WL 733866, at *3–4
(E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) (imposing the condition that plaintiff produces “all previously
ordered discovery material” within ten days of refiling the lawsuit).
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
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B. Common Factors Courts Consider When Deciding Motions
for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice
Whether, and on what conditions, to grant a motion for voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is within the “sound discretion of the trial
court.”34 Courts use a “clear legal prejudice” standard to decide Rule
41(a)(2) motions.35 Under this standard, courts will allow a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice unless the defendant will
suffer undue prejudice as a result.36 The goal of this analysis is to balance
the interests of both parties.37
There is no bright-line rule for what constitutes undue prejudice under
this standard. Instead, courts use a balancing test that considers the totality
of the circumstances of each case.38 At minimum, the defendant must show
that she will suffer prejudice beyond the mere prospect of a subsequent
lawsuit on the same set of facts.39
Courts consider various factors in the clear legal prejudice analysis.
Some common factors include the defendant’s effort and expense in
preparing for trial, any excessive delay or lack of diligence by the plaintiff,
the adequacy of the plaintiff’s explanation for dismissal, and the extent to
which the lawsuit has progressed.40 These factors are only guidelines and
are not exhaustive.41 But the analysis must focus on the potential prejudice
to the defendant, not on the convenience of the court, witnesses, or jurors.42

34. Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 986 (5th Cir. 1989); accord Tucker v.
Tucker, 434 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1982); Bradshaw v. Ewing, 376 S.E.2d 264, 267 (S.C.
1989).
35. E.g., Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262
(8th Cir. 1993); Phillips, 874 F.2d at 986. Some courts use the phrase “plain legal prejudice”
to describe the same standard. See, e.g., Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 477 F.3d 924,
927 (7th Cir. 2007); Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Tr., 625 A.2d 859, 863–64
(Del. 1993); Smith v. Graham, 147 P.3d 859, 868 (Kan. 2006).
36. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins., 665 F.2d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
37. See Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2015) (“While the district
court should keep in mind the interests of the defendant, . . . the court should also weigh the
relevant equities and do justice between the parties in each case.” (quoting McCants v. Ford
Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986))).
38. See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
39. E.g., Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947); Goodman v.
Gordon, 447 P.2d 230, 232–33 (Ariz. 1968).
40. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc., 583 F.3d
948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005); Witzman
v. Gross, 148 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1998); Draper, 625 A.2d at 863–64; Aventis Pasteur,
Inc. v. Skevofilax, 914 A.2d 113, 122 (Md. 2007) (collecting cases applying various factors);
see also 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 2364 (3d ed. 2008) (collecting cases describing the different factors each federal court of
appeals considers).
41. E.g., Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir. 1996).
42. See, e.g., Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1997); Durham v. Fla.
E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967) (“Courts exist to serve the parties, and
not to serve themselves, or to present a record with respect to dispatch of business.”).
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C. Purpose and Policy of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are legislative public policy decisions about the
time period within which a plaintiff may pursue a particular claim.43 They
provide defendants with a defense to liability in untimely lawsuits.44
However, these time limitations vary considerably among jurisdictions.45
Statutes of limitations serve three principal objectives. First, they
provide defendants with repose by eliminating the possibility of litigation
after a reasonable period of time46 and by protecting settled expectations.47
Second, they ensure that claims will be resolved while sufficient evidence is
still available for the accurate disposition of cases.48 Third, they encourage
plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently.49
D. Choice of Law: Which Statute of Limitations Governs?
As discussed in Part I.C, statutes of limitations vary considerably among
jurisdictions.50 To understand when a plaintiff can dismiss a time-barred
claim in one jurisdiction and refile it in another, this Note turns to a
discussion on how courts determine which statute of limitations governs a
particular claim.
1. State Court
In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,51 the U.S. Supreme Court held that each state
must decide how to treat statutes of limitations for choice-of-law
purposes.52 A state may choose to apply its own statute of limitations to
claims that are otherwise governed by the substantive law of a foreign

43. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
44. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1989).
45. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-52 (West 2016) (providing for a three year
statute of limitations for a breach of a written contract claim), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3104 (West 2016) (providing for a one year statute of limitations for a personal injury claim),
with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (West 2016) (providing for a ten year statute of limitations
for a breach of a written contract claim), and N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 28-01-16 (West
2016) (providing for a six year statute of limitations for a personal injury claim).
46. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980) (“The statute of
limitations establishes a deadline after which . . . it is unfair to require the defendant to
attempt to piece together his defense to an old claim.”).
47. See, e.g., Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: Rethinking How
Choice-of-Law Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 500
(2015) (“Such limitations allow society to move forward in its business, social, and political
processes without fear of having dramatic upheavals based on judicial resolutions of old
claims.”).
48. See, e.g., Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 702 P.2d 563, 566 (Cal. 1985).
49. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 490–91 (1997) (explaining that “punishing” some plaintiffs, by
dismissing their suits as time barred, can benefit the legal system by encouraging other
plaintiffs to act diligently).
50. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
52. See id. at 725–26.
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state.53 A state may do so regardless of whether its own limitations period
is longer or shorter than that of the state where the substantive right arose.54
While a majority of states apply their own statutes of limitations, several
states take different approaches.55 This Note is limited in scope to cases
where courts will apply their own statutes of limitations.
There are several exceptions to this general rule. State courts will apply a
foreign statute of limitations when a statute that creates a substantive right
also provides a limitations period,56 a statute of limitations extinguishes a
substantive right under the law of the state where the claim arose,57 or a
borrowing statute applies.58
2. Federal Court
In federal court, the applicable statute of limitations depends on whether
the court is hearing a federal question claim or a diversity claim. A court
hearing a federal question claim will apply a federal statute of limitations
when Congress has provided one.59 When there is no explicit limitation
period, the applicable statute of limitations is a question of federal common
law.60 Federal common law directs courts to look to closely analogous state
statutes of limitations, related federal statutes of limitations, and federal
equity doctrines.61
A federal court hearing a diversity claim, however, will apply the same
statute of limitations that a state court in its jurisdiction would apply. Erie

53. See id. at 725, 730.
54. See id. (explaining that each state has the right to decide to apply its own shorter
statute of limitations to protect itself from wasting judicial resources on stale claims and that
each state also has the right to decide to apply its own longer statute of limitations when a
remedy is no longer available in the jurisdiction where a right arose).
55. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011:
Twenty-Fifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 340–42 (2012) (surveying the fifty
states’ choice-of-law rules for statutes of limitations). Some states have adopted the
Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act of 1982, which applies the statute of limitations
of the state whose substantive law governs the claim. Id. Other states use a balancing test to
determine which state has a stronger interest in applying its limitation period. Id. Finally,
several states follow section 142 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which
presumes that the forum state’s limitations period applies but has a flexible approach for
cases where the forum state does not have an interest in applying its own statute of
limitations. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (AM. LAW
INST. 2015).
56. E.g., Price v. Litton Sys., Inc., 784 F.2d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 1986).
57. E.g., Walls v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 906 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1990).
58. E.g., Combs v. Int’l Ins., 354 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2004). A borrowing statute is a
legislative exception to the general rule that a forum may apply its own statute of limitations.
Id. When the statute of limitations is shorter in the state where the substantive right arose,
the forum state “borrows” the foreign state’s statute of limitations instead of applying its
own. Id.
59. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158–59 (1983). Congress has
provided a general four-year statute of limitations for federal statutes enacted after December
1, 1990, that do not include a specific limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2012).
60. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158–59.
61. Id. at 158–62; see also N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1995)
(collecting federal cases borrowing state and federal statutes of limitations).
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Railroad v. Tompkins62 requires a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.63
Statutes of limitations are “substantive” for Erie purposes.64 To determine
which state’s statute of limitations applies, the court must apply the forum
state’s choice-of-law rules.65
Accordingly, in both state cases and federal diversity cases, a plaintiff
may be able to litigate a claim that is time barred in one jurisdiction by
filing it in another jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.66 To do
this, the plaintiff must file the lawsuit in a court located in a state that
satisfies the following requirements:
[I]ts statute of limitations has not yet run; it will . . . apply its own longer
statute; it will interpret its “borrowing statute,” if any, as not covering
most cases, and thus will not borrow the shorter statute of any of the states
with some connection to the case; [and] the defendant is amenable to
process there.67

This procedure is not available in federal question cases because the
applicable statute of limitations for federal question claims does not vary
among jurisdictions.68
II. THE CONFLICTING WAYS IN WHICH THE LOSS
OF A STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS DEFENSE FACTORS INTO
THE CLEAR LEGAL PREJUDICE ANALYSIS
As discussed in Part I.C, courts generally agree that a plaintiff should be
able to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice unless the defendant
will suffer clear legal prejudice as a result.69 Courts also agree that the
mere prospect of a subsequent lawsuit on the same facts does not factor into
the prejudice analysis70 and that a plaintiff’s incidental gain of a tactical
advantage in subsequent litigation does not constitute clear legal
62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
63. See id. at 78, 92.
64. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945) (holding that where a federal
statute of limitations conflicts with a state statute of limitations, the court cannot treat the
federal limitations period as “procedural” and thus apply it; the court must apply the state
statute of limitations); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 683, 693. Although statutes of limitations may be considered “procedural” for
choice-of-law purposes, they are considered “substantive” for Erie purposes. Liberty
Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2013). Such distinction exists
because the substance-procedure dichotomy has different meanings in the two contexts. Id.
The purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the Erie context is “to
establish . . . substantial uniformity of predictable outcome between cases tried in a federal
court and cases tried in the courts of the State in which the federal court sits.” Id. at 153. By
contrast, the purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the context of choice of law
“is not to establish uniformity but to delimit spheres of state legislative competence.” Id.
65. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494–97 (1941); see also
Liberty, 718 F.3d at 151.
66. See, e.g., Liberty, 718 F.3d at 152.
67. See Weinberg, supra note 64, at 692.
68. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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prejudice.71 However, courts disagree about how a defendant’s loss of a
statute-of-limitations defense should factor into the clear legal prejudice
analysis.
This disagreement stems from different analyses of four factors: (1) the
primary purpose of voluntary dismissal, (2) whether the loss of a statute-oflimitations defense results in a subsequent lawsuit on the same facts, (3)
whether a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense results in the
plaintiff’s incidental gain of a tactical advantage in subsequent litigation,
and (4) whether curative conditions can adequately compensate a defendant
for the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense.72 As a result, courts have
developed two approaches to synthesize these factors. This part discusses
these two approaches. Specifically, Part II.A discusses the bright-line rule
and Part II.B discusses the balancing test.
A. The Bright-Line Rule
Some courts apply a bright-line rule that a plaintiff may not voluntarily
dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice and refile it in another
jurisdiction.73 Under this approach, a defendant’s loss of a statute-oflimitations defense constitutes per se legal prejudice. It automatically
precludes a dismissal without prejudice, and courts will not consider any
additional factors in the clear legal prejudice analysis.74
This rule is based on four principles. First, the primary purpose of the
voluntary dismissal rule is to protect the defendant from clear legal
prejudice.75
The definition of “legal prejudice” includes material
restrictions on a litigant’s ability to pursue her claim or defense.76 A
defendant’s position is substantially impaired when a dismissal causes her
to lose a statute-of-limitations defense, i.e., an absolute defense to
liability.77 Second, the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense does not
71. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1989); McCants
v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856–57 (11th Cir. 1986).
72. See supra Part II.A–B.
73. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257,
1262 (8th Cir. 1993); Phillips, F.2d 984 at 987. Some courts have explicitly adopted a
bright-line rule, while others have done so implicitly. In all of these cases, the defendant’s
loss of a statute-of-limitations defense mechanically outweighs consideration of all the other
factors.
74. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262; Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987.
75. E.g., Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“The primary purpose of [Rule 41(a)(2)] in interposing the requirement of court approval is
to protect the nonmovant from unfair treatment.”); Fisher v. P.R. Marine Mgmt., Inc., 940
F.2d 1502, 1503 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen exercising its discretion in considering a
dismissal without prejudice, the court should keep in mind the interests of the defendant, for
Rule 41(a)(2) exists chiefly for protection of defendants.”); Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987 (“When
considering a dismissal without prejudice, the court should keep in mind the interests of the
defendant, for it is his position which should be protected.”).
76. See LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603–04 (5th Cir. 1976).
77. See, e.g., Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987 (“If [stripping the defendant of an absolute
defense] does not constitute clear legal prejudice to the defendant, it is hard to envision what
would.”); Brief for Appellants at 26, Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 1998) (Nos. 962146, 96-2203, 96-2150, 96-2149, 96-2147, 96-2204) (arguing that granting voluntary
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merely result in a subsequent lawsuit on the same facts; it results in a
subsequent lawsuit that is fundamentally different.78 The second lawsuit
involves a substantial new fact: a complete defense to liability is no longer
available.79 Third, a plaintiff’s use of voluntary dismissal to avoid an
adverse judgment on the merits does not result in a plaintiff’s incidental
gain of a tactical advantage—it is an abuse of a procedural rule.80 A
plaintiff should not be allowed to “maneuver” the litigation to strip a
defendant of an existing advantage.81 Fourth, curative conditions do not
adequately protect the defendant from the prejudice that results from the
loss of a statute-of-limitations defense.82 There is no amount of costs that
can reasonably compensate a defendant for the loss of an absolute defense
to liability.83 Courts that employ this approach routinely deny motions for
voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the face of a valid statute-oflimitations defense.
Take the Fifth Circuit, for example. In Phillips v. Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad,84 the court adopted the bright-line rule and held that the loss of a
statute-of-limitations defense constitutes per se legal prejudice sufficient to
bar voluntary dismissal without prejudice.85 The court reasoned that the
voluntary dismissal analysis should focus on protecting the interests of the
defendant.86 Courts should not allow plaintiffs to use voluntary dismissal
to “maneuver” the litigation and cause a defendant to lose an existing

dismissal in the face of a valid statute-of-limitations defense has the same effect as if the
court kept the action in the original forum and impermissibly denied the defendant the right
to assert an established defense).
78. See, e.g., Butts ex rel. Iverson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 802
N.W.2d 839, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“The mere prospect of a second lawsuit is not
sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial of a [Rule 41(a)(2)] motion to
dismiss. . . . [However,] a voluntary dismissal that strips a defendant of a defense that would
otherwise be available may be sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial.”).
79. E.g., Phillips 874 F.2d at 987.
80. See, e.g., Skinner v. First Am. Bank of Va., No. 93-2493, 1995 WL 507264, at *2
(4th Cir. Aug. 28, 1995) (“[V]oluntary dismissal without prejudice [is] improper with respect
to claims ‘faced with imminent adverse determination in a federal action.’” (quoting Davis v.
USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th Cir. 1987) (Phillips, J., dissenting))); Davis, 819 F.2d
at 1277 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is unfair to a defendant to allow a plaintiff
to chose her forum, then be allowed to “bail out scot-free” and refile her claim in another
forum after “seeing the adverse handwriting on the wall in the first chosen forum”); McCants
v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 858 (11th Cir. 1986) (denying voluntary dismissal because
a plaintiff should not be able to avoid the “prescribed legal effect of his delays”).
81. E.g., Placid Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 792 F.2d 1127, 1134–35 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1986) (denying voluntary dismissal where the plaintiff was attempting to use Rule
41(a)(2) as a forum shopping tool to avoid the defendant’s statute-of-limitations defense);
see also Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1994) (“At the
point when the law clearly dictates a result for the defendant, it is unfair to subject him to
continued exposure to potential liability by dismissing the case without prejudice.”).
82. See, e.g., Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 969–71 (8th Cir. 1984).
83. See id. (stating that where a defendant is entitled to a judgment on the merits, there is
no amount of costs that can compensate the defendant for the risk of continuing liability).
84. 874 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1989).
85. See id. at 984.
86. Id. at 987.
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advantage, such as a statute-of-limitations defense.87 Further, the second
lawsuit would not be the same lawsuit on the same set of facts.88 The court
explained that “the facts in the second lawsuit would differ in that the
defendant would be stripped of an absolute defense to the suit—the
difference between winning the case without a trial and abiding the
unknown outcome of such a proceeding.”89
The Eighth Circuit similarly followed this reasoning in Metropolitan
Federal Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co.90 There, the court stated
in dicta that it “would consider it an abuse of discretion for a district court
to find no legal prejudice, and thus to grant voluntary dismissal, where the
nonmoving party has demonstrated a valid statute of limitations defense to
the claims sought to be dismissed.”91
Likewise, in Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co.,92 the Seventh Circuit
relied on Phillips and Metropolitan Federal Bank in holding it to be an
abuse of discretion for a court to grant voluntary dismissal without
prejudice when the defendant has demonstrated a valid statute-oflimitations defense.93 Citing Phillips and Metropolitan Federal Bank, the
court explained that a defendant acquires a legal right to assert a statute-oflimitations defense when a plaintiff files a time-barred claim.94 Therefore,
the defendant would suffer clear legal prejudice if the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claim without prejudice instead of dismissing the claim on
statute-of-limitations grounds.95
B. The Balancing Test
Other courts have rejected the bright-line rule and continue to apply their
established balancing tests.96 Under this approach, courts consider the
defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense as an additional factor,
but it does not automatically outweigh the other factors. In practice, these
courts will allow a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice
as long as the established clear legal prejudice factors weigh in the
plaintiff’s favor. While these courts purport to consider the defendant’s

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 999 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 1263. The court did not apply the rule in this case because the defendant did
not prove the validity of his statute-of-limitations defense. See id. But this dicta has become
strong precedent for subsequent cases. See e.g., Sutton-Price v. Daugherty Sys., Inc., 2012
WL 2282344, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 18, 2012); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 WL
5274338, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 18, 2008).
92. 477 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2007).
93. The court explained that under Wisconsin law, the expiration of a statute of
limitations “extinguishes the cause of action of the potential plaintiff and it also creates a
right enjoyed by the would-be defendant to insist on that statutory bar.” Id. at 927 (citing
Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1263, and Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 927–28.
96. See supra Part I.B.
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loss of a statute-of-limitations defense as an additional factor, it will never
be the deciding factor.
Like the bright-line rule, this approach is also based on four principles.
First, the primary purpose of the voluntary dismissal rule is to preserve
plaintiffs’ claims by allowing them to “start over” and to compensate the
defendant for duplicative costs and efforts.97 Forcing a plaintiff to suffer
for her lawyer’s error of filing a claim in a jurisdiction where the action is
time barred contradicts strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on
their merits.98 Because a dismissal with prejudice ends a plaintiff’s claim,
it is considered a “sanction of last resort”99 and is inappropriate in cases
where the plaintiff has acted diligently and in good faith.100 Second, while
a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense may result in the
inconvenience of a second lawsuit, it does not alter the underlying facts that
give rise to the claim.101 Third, when a defendant loses a statute-oflimitations defense, she merely loses a tactical advantage while the plaintiff
gains one incidentally.102 When a plaintiff’s lawyer files a time-barred
claim, the defendant does not acquire a vested interest in that jurisdiction;

97. See, e.g., McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985) (“As . . . the
language and history of Rule 41(a) imply, the general purpose of the rule is to preserve the
plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary nonsuit and start over so long as the defendant is not
hurt.”); LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the
purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to “freely permit the plaintiff, with court approval, to voluntarily
dismiss an action [without prejudice]” where dismissal will not result in injustice to the
defendant).
98. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 646–49 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting)
(explaining that while penalizing a plaintiff for his lawyer’s errors may reduce a court’s
docket, it “undercuts the very purposes for which courts were created—that is, to try cases
on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the
parties”); see also id. (“[A plaintiff should not be] awakened to his lawyer’s incapacity for
the first time by a sudden brutal pronouncement of the court: ‘Your lawyer has failed to
perform his duty . . . and we are therefore throwing you out of court on your heels.’”);
Germain v. Semco Serv. Mach. Co., 79 F.R.D. 85, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[L]itigants
generally ought not to be disadvantaged by such errors of counsel.”).
99. See Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). While Goforth is a
case about a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute, see FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), the same
reasoning is applicable in the context of Rule 41(a) dismissals. In both contexts, the court
exercises discretion about whether to dismiss the claim with or without prejudice. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 41(a)–(b). Both inquiries ask whether the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by
a dismissal without prejudice. Compare Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.
1982) (conducting a Rule 41(b) inquiry and citing cases that consider responsibility of the
plaintiff, intentional conduct, and prejudice to the defendant), with McCants v. Ford Motor
Co., 781 F.2d 855, 858–59 (11th Cir. 1986) (conducting a Rule 41(a)(2) inquiry and
considering factors such as responsibility of the plaintiff, intentional conduct, and prejudice
to the defendant).
100. See, e.g., McCants, 781 F.2d at 859.
101. See, e.g., Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
loss of a statute-of-limitations does not change the subject matter of the lawsuit).
102. See McCants, 781 F.2d at 859 (holding that although “the plaintiff’s untimeliness
yielded the defendant a potentially great legal advantage” in the first forum that the
defendant would presumably lose in a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim, the defendant
did not suffer any clear legal prejudice as a result of such loss); see, e.g., Arias, 776 F.3d at
1271.
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the defendant acquires a procedural advantage.103 Finally, curative
conditions adequately protect the defendant from the inconvenience of a
subsequent lawsuit.104 Courts have broad discretion in attaching conditions
to voluntary dismissal orders.105 The “extreme” sanction of dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate only in cases where lesser protections would not
serve the interests of justice.106 Courts that follow this approach routinely
grant motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice even in the face of
a valid statute-of-limitations defense.
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has expressly rejected a bright-line
rule in this context.107 In McCants v. Ford Motor Co.,108 the court held that
the loss of a valid statute-of-limitations defense does not bar a dismissal
without prejudice.109 Instead, the court applied its established balancing
test and reasoned that the loss of a valid statute-of-limitations defense
merely results in “a second lawsuit on the same set of facts.”110 The court
found it significant that the plaintiff had acted diligently and that there was
no evidence of bad faith.111 Under these circumstances, the court found
that the defendant would not suffer clear legal prejudice as the result of a
dismissal without prejudice.112
Similarly, the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiff’s
motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice in Klar v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co.113 Here, the plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal because
he believed his claim was time-barred in New York, and he wanted to refile

103. See Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 86 (rejecting defendant’s claim of prejudice, stating that a
defendant does not acquire a vested interest when plaintiff’s counsel files a lawsuit in a
jurisdiction where the statute of limitations has expired).
104. See, e.g., McCants, 781 F.2d at 860 (explaining that ordinarily a court will not allow
a plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice after the defendant has been put to
considerable expense and effort, except on conditions that compensate the defendant for
such time and effort).
105. See Diamond v. United States, 267 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that a district
court’s Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal order is only reviewable for abuse of discretion); supra note
15 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding dismissal
with prejudice was appropriate where the plaintiff “engaged in a pattern of delay and
deliberately refused to comply with the directions of the court” because any lesser sanction
would not have served the interests of justice).
107. See Arias, 776 F.3d at 1274–75 (“We recognize . . . that other circuits have found
clear legal prejudice to exist when a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal is granted in the face of a valid
statute-of-limitations defense. . . . [However,] a per se rule prohibiting district courts from
allowing dismissals without prejudice . . . could significantly undermine the district court’s
ability to balance the equities in ruling on a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2).”); McCants, 781 F.2d at 858–59 (holding that the loss of a statute-of-limitations
defense does not constitute clear legal prejudice and, without more, should not preclude
dismissal without prejudice).
108. 781 F.2d 855 (11th Cir. 1986).
109. See id. at 859.
110. Id. In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the
action was time barred in Alabama. See id. at 858.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 857–58.
113. 14 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the action in Ohio, where a longer statute of limitations would apply.114
The court explained that Rule 41(a)(2) was enacted to protect defendants
from abusive practices of plaintiffs who filed lawsuits with “no real object
in mind” other than putting defendants to significant expenses.115 Absent a
finding of abusive intent, the court granted voluntary dismissal conditioned
on (1) the refiling of the action in Ohio and (2) the plaintiff’s payment of
costs and attorney’s fees.116
Germain v. Semco Service Machine Co.117 provides another example of
the balancing test approach. Here, the plaintiff moved for voluntary
dismissal for the express purpose of refiling the action in New Jersey,
where a longer statute of limitations would apply.118 In its prejudice
analysis, the court focused on the aspect of duplicative effort rather than
potential abusive intent.119 The court explained that “[t]he further along a
case has proceeded, the more the prejudice to the defendant in granting the
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.”120 Because the case was in the preliminary
stages of discovery, the court found that little duplicative effort would result
from the voluntary dismissal in New York and the refiling in New
Jersey.121 The court granted voluntary dismissal conditioned on the
plaintiff’s agreement to make available discovery from the first proceeding
and to pay opposing counsel’s costs and attorney’s fees.122
The court in Ross v. Raymark Industries, Inc.123 also applied the
balancing test approach but for different reasons. The Pennsylvania court
explained that even if it granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff could still proceed with a subsequent New Jersey
action because the doctrine of res judicata would not apply to a statute-oflimitations dismissal.124 Further, the court explained that if it allowed a
dismissal without prejudice, it could attach curative conditions to the
dismissal order, thus the defendants would be protected from duplicative
expenses.125 If, however, the court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the defendants would bear the expenses for both the
Pennsylvania action and the subsequent New Jersey action.126

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 176–77.
117. 79 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
118. Id. at 86.
119. Id. at 86–87.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 87.
122. Id.
123. No. 84-3663, 1985 WL 5035 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1985).
124. See id. at *2 (“Dismissal of an action on limitations grounds merely bars the remedy
in the first system of courts, and leaves [a] second system of courts free to grant a remedy
that is not barred by its own rules of limitations.”).
125. See id.
126. See id.
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III. THE SOLUTION THROUGH PRECLUSION:
RES JUDICATA AS A THRESHOLD INQUIRY
This part argues that courts overlook a fundamental factor in deciding
whether to dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice. Specifically,
they do not consider what the claim-preclusive effect of a statute-oflimitations dismissal would be, which is a vital consideration to accurately
balance the parties’ interests in the clear legal prejudice analysis.
Part III.A explains how the claim-preclusive effect of a statute-oflimitations dismissal varies based on the jurisdiction that renders a
judgment. Part III.B proposes that, as a threshold inquiry, courts should
determine whether a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim
preclusive. Based on this determination, courts can accurately assess how a
dismissal without prejudice will affect the parties’ interests and whether
such dismissal is warranted.
A. The Preclusive (or Nonpreclusive) Effect of
Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals
The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, provides
that a “final judgment, rendered upon the merits by a court having
jurisdiction . . . is a complete bar to a new suit between [the parties] on the
same cause of action.”127 Courts disagree about whether statute-oflimitations dismissals are judgments “on the merits,” and, therefore, in
some jurisdictions such dismissals are claim preclusive while in others they
are not.
In state court, the preclusion law of the state that renders a judgment
governs the claim-preclusive effect of that judgment.128 States are divided
about whether statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive—some
states preclude a plaintiff from refiling the claim elsewhere and other states
do not.
In federal court, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect
of a judgment.129 In federal question cases, statute-of-limitations dismissals
are claim preclusive.130 But in diversity cases, the state law in the
jurisdiction where the federal court sits governs the preclusive effect of a
judgment.131

127. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001).
128. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires every state to give
a foreign state’s judgment the same preclusive effect it would be accorded by the state that
rendered the judgment. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Statute
requires every federal court to give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect it
would be accorded by the state that rendered the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
129. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (explaining that under federal common law, both state and
federal courts must give a federal court judgment the preclusive effect prescribed by federal
law).
130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995).
131. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
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1. The Effect of Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals
That Are Not Claim Preclusive
In states where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive,
a statute-of-limitations dismissal does not bar a plaintiff from refiling her
claim.132 In these states, statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim
preclusive because they are not judgments “on the merits.”133 As a matter
of issue preclusion, however, a statute-of-limitations dismissal will bar the
plaintiff from refiling the lawsuit in any court in the state where the
judgment was rendered.134
This rule reflects the traditional view that statutes of limitations are
procedural devices. They limit a plaintiff’s ability to obtain a remedy in a
particular court system,135 but they do not extinguish the underlying
substantive claim.136 In these jurisdictions, a dismissal on statute-oflimitations grounds is “a judgment on the procedural merits, not the
substantive merits.”137
2. The Effect of Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals
That Are Claim Preclusive
In other states, statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive. In
these jurisdictions, a statute-of-limitations dismissal bars the plaintiff from
refiling the action anywhere.138 These states treat statute-of-limitations
dismissals as judgments “on the merits.”139 Under this approach, the
132. See id. at 504–06.
133. See, e.g., Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 114
S.W.3d 189, 197 (Ark. 2003); Advest Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1995);
Stewart ex rel. K.B. v. G.M., 490 N.W.2d 715, 717 (N.D. 1992); Green v. Siegel, Barnett &
Schutz, 557 N.W.2d 396, 405 (S.D. 1996).
134. Issue preclusion “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually
litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment.” Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748
(2001)). Unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not require a judgment “on the
merits.” See id. The issue that is resolved by a statute-of-limitations dismissal is that the
statute of limitations in the state that rendered the judgment has expired. See, e.g., Advest,
Inc., 668 A.2d at 371 (“Although a judgment based on the running of the statute of
limitations bars the plaintiff from bringing an action to relitigate the claim within that
jurisdiction, it is not a judgment on the merits and does not erase the plaintiff’s claim.”).
135. For example, a judgment may preclude a plaintiff from obtaining a remedy from any
court in one state’s court system, but it does not preclude the plaintiff from obtaining a
remedy from a court in another state’s court system or a court in the federal court system.
136. See, e.g., Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 71 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Ark. 2002);
Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002); Griffin v. BSFI W. E & P,
Inc., 812 So. 2d 726, 732 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
137. E.g., Griffin, 812 So. 2d at 732.
138. See e.g., Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 1987) (“An adjudication based
upon the running of a statute of limitation, as a bar to further action, is just such a judgment
on the merits.” (quoting Creech v. Town of Walkerton, 472 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984))).
139. See, e.g., Montaño v. Browning, 48 P.3d 494, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Towe v.
Connors, 644 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665
N.E.2d 1199, 1204–05 (Ill. 1996); N. Am. Specialty Ins. v. Bos. Med. Grp., 906 A.2d 1042,
1050 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
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dismissal extinguishes both the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a remedy and the
underlying substantive right.140
States have departed from the traditional view and adopted this rule for
various reasons. In some states, the rule is based on a narrow interpretation
of state rules that parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which
governs the effect of involuntary dismissals.141 Rule 41(b) provides that,
“unless the dismissal order states otherwise,” an involuntary dismissal
operates as a judgment “on the merits,” except if dismissed for (1) lack of
jurisdiction, (2) lack of venue, or (3) failure to join a party under Rule
19.142 Because a statute-of-limitations dismissal is not one of the
enumerated exceptions, some states have decided that it operates as a
judgment on the merits.143 In other states, the rule is written into the statute
itself. These statutes explicitly state that the expiration of the limitations
period extinguishes both the remedy and the right.144
B. The Missing Factor
in the Clear Legal Prejudice Analysis: Res Judicata
The differences in state preclusion law create significant differences in
what it means for a defendant to lose the ability to assert a statute-oflimitations defense. In jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals
are not claim preclusive, a defendant will be subject to a subsequent lawsuit
whether a court dismisses the plaintiff’s initial claim without prejudice or
on statute-of-limitations grounds.145 Thus, the defendant’s interests are not
substantially impaired by the “loss” of a statute-of-limitations defense. But
in jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive,
a court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice can substantially impair a
defendant’s interests.146 A defendant would not be subject to a subsequent
lawsuit if the court dismissed the claim on statute-of-limitations grounds.
But if the court dismisses without prejudice, the defendant can be haled into
court upon the plaintiff’s refiling in a different jurisdiction.
To fairly balance the interests of the parties, the clear legal prejudice
analysis should reflect the totality of the circumstances.147 Both the brightline rule and the balancing test fail to do so as they are currently applied.
The bright-line rule is based on the faulty premise that statute-of-limitations
dismissals are always claim preclusive. As such, the bright-line rule is
misleading and inefficient in jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations
dismissals are not claim preclusive. The balancing test is equally
problematic because it fails to consider the significance (or lack thereof) of
140.
141.
41(b).
142.
143.
2007).
144.
145.
146.
147.

See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.05 (West 2015).
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), with S.C. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and COLO. R. CIV. P.
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
E.g., Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit, 733 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich.
This approach follows the federal court approach.
E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.05.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2015).
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the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense. It does not resolve, and
therefore cannot balance, how the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense
would affect the defendant’s interests. This approach is inefficient in
jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive.
Given the variations in preclusion law, neither approach should be
uniformly applied.148 Rather, courts should conduct a threshold inquiry
into whether a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim preclusive.149
When a statute-of-limitations dismissal would not be claim preclusive,
courts should use their established balancing tests to decide whether to
dismiss a claim without prejudice. A defendant’s loss of a statute-oflimitations defense should not factor into the analysis. On the other hand,
when a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim preclusive, courts
should apply the bright-line rule and dismiss the claim on statute-oflimitations grounds.
1. When Courts Should Use the Bright-Line Rule
When a statute-of-limitations dismissal is claim preclusive, it has a
fundamentally different effect than a dismissal without prejudice: the
plaintiff cannot refile the lawsuit in another jurisdiction even if a longer
statute of limitations would apply elsewhere. In these jurisdictions, a
statute-of-limitations dismissal provides the defendant with an absolute
defense to liability.150 Thus, a defendant’s interests are substantially
impaired when she loses the ability to assert that defense. In these
jurisdictions, the courts or the legislatures have decided that a defendant
acquires a right to an absolute defense when a plaintiff files a time-barred
claim. A defendant’s right to assert a statute-of-limitations defense is
equivalent to a plaintiff’s right to assert a substantive claim.151 This leads
to the question: Who should suffer, the plaintiff who mistakenly files a
time-barred claim or the defendant who is forced into court against her will?
Even at common law, where plaintiffs had an absolute right to
voluntarily dismiss their claims prior to judgment or verdict, courts denied
voluntary dismissal in cases where the defendant was entitled to a judgment
on the merits.152 In jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are
claim preclusive, the defendant is entitled to a judgment on the merits when
a plaintiff files a time-barred claim. A plaintiff should not be able to use a
148. This issue is particularly problematic when a federal circuit court adopts one
approach because it is binding on all of the district courts within that circuit. For example,
the Fifth Circuit includes district courts in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. In Louisiana,
statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive. See Griffin v. BSFI W. E & P, Inc.,
812 So. 2d 726, 732 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
149. See Ross v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. 84-3663, 1985 WL 5035 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30,
1985). This approach assumes the defendant has a valid statute-of-limitations defense. If
there is a dispute about whether a claim is time barred, that should be resolved before the
voluntary dismissal issue.
150. See supra Part III.A.1.
151. See Brief for Appellants at 26, Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 1998) (Nos.
96-2146, 96-2203, 96-2150, 96-2149, 96-2147, 96-2204).
152. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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procedural rule to avoid an adverse judgment on the merits. Further, there
is no amount of costs that can adequately compensate a defendant for the
loss of an absolute defense to liability.153 Therefore, in these jurisdictions,
there is no need to balance any factors; the loss of a statute-of-limitations
defense constitutes per se legal prejudice sufficient to bar a dismissal
without prejudice.
Recall in McCants, the Eleventh Circuit held that the loss of a statute-oflimitations defense alone does not constitute clear legal prejudice.154 The
court emphasized that the plaintiff had acted diligently and that there was
no evidence of bad faith.155 The court found that the loss of a valid statuteof-limitations defense would merely result in a subsequent lawsuit on the
same facts, and therefore the defendant would not suffer clear legal
prejudice as a result of a dismissal without prejudice.156 This action,
however, arose in Alabama and the court failed to consider that statute-oflimitations dismissals are claim preclusive in that state.157 If the court
dismissed the claim on statute-of-limitations grounds, the defendant would
be completely absolved from liability.
Similarly in Klar and Germain, the district courts granted the plaintiffs’
motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.158 The courts based
their decisions on the lack of evidence of abusive intent on the part of the
plaintiffs and on the immaturity of the case.159 Still, the courts failed to
consider the claim-preclusive effect of statute-of-limitations dismissals in
New York. While New York preclusion law may not have been settled
when these cases were decided, the state now holds that statute-oflimitations dismissals are claim preclusive.160 Nonetheless, courts in
various jurisdictions continue to cite Klar and Germain for the proposition
that the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense alone is not sufficient to bar
voluntary dismissal without prejudice.161
These decisions have cemented bad precedent in jurisdictions where
statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive. These courts do

153. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
154. McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 859 (11th Cir. 1986).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Clothier v. Counseling, Inc., 875 So. 2d 1198, 1200 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
(citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (holding a dismissal on
statute-of-limitations grounds is a dismissal on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion)).
158. See Germain v. Semco Serv. Mach. Co., 79 F.R.D. 85, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Klar v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 14 F.R.D. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
159. See Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 87; Klar, 14 F.R.D. at 176.
160. Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 429 N.E.2d 746, 750 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a
dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds is “sufficiently close to the merits for claim
preclusion purposes to bar a second action”).
161. See, e.g., McCants, 781 F.2d at 858; Greguski v. Long Island R.R., 163 F.R.D. 221,
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Klar for the proposition that “the fact that the movant seeks a
dismissal to take advantage of a more favorable limitations period by subsequently filing suit
in a different court should not bar the dismissal”); Bamdad Mech. Co. v. United Techs.
Corp., 109 F.R.D. 128, 131–32 (D. Del. 1985).
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not account for the substantial prejudice to the defendant that results from a
dismissal without prejudice.162
2. When Courts Should Use the Balancing Test
When a statute-of-limitations dismissal is not claim preclusive, it has
largely the same effect as a dismissal without prejudice: the plaintiff can
refile the claim in a jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations. The
only notable difference is that, as a matter of issue preclusion, a statute-oflimitations dismissal will bar the plaintiff from refiling the action in the
original jurisdiction, while a dismissal without prejudice will not.163 When
a plaintiff seeks a dismissal without prejudice for the express purpose of
refiling the action elsewhere, the only logical conclusion is that the plaintiff
will not refile the action in the original forum. In fact, a court can ensure
that the plaintiff will not refile the action in the original forum by imposing
a curative condition to that effect.164 When a court enters judgment for the
defendant on statute-of-limitations grounds, the court cannot impose
curative conditions to protect the defendant from duplicative costs and
efforts.165 The defendant is left subject to a second lawsuit at her own
expense.166
In these jurisdictions, courts should use their established clear legal
prejudice balancing tests to determine whether a dismissal without
prejudice is warranted. Courts should not consider a defendant’s loss of a
statute-of-limitations defense as an additional factor because the
defendant’s interests are not impaired as a result of a dismissal without
prejudice.167 The defendant will be subject to another lawsuit even if the
court dismisses the claim on statute-of-limitations grounds.168
162. The Seventh Circuit skirted around the res judicata factor in Wojtas. In Wojtas, the
court noted that in Wisconsin the expiration of the statute of limitations extinguishes both the
remedy and the right to bring the substantive claim. See Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co.,
477 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 2007). The court therefore concluded that the defendant would
suffer clear legal prejudice as a result of a dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 927–28. While
this decision is sound, the court did not adequately explain its reasoning. The court cited
Phillips and Metropolitan Federal Bank for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion to
allow voluntary dismissal without prejudice when the defendant would lose a statute-oflimitations defense. Id. Courts have interpreted this as a bright-line rule in the Seventh
Circuit rather than a narrow decision based on Wisconsin’s preclusion law. See, e.g., Arias v.
Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015); Butts ex rel. Iverson v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 802 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
163. Compare, Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1995) (holding that as
a matter of issue preclusion, a judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds in Connecticut is
not on the merits and only precludes the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether the
Connecticut statute of limitations has run; “[i]n other words, the prior action renders the
issue of Connecticut’s statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of issue preclusion”), with
LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that a dismissal
without prejudice puts the plaintiff in the legal position as if he never filed the lawsuit).
164. See Ross v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. 84-3663, 1985 WL 5035, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
30, 1985).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Durham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368–69 (5th Cir. 1967).
168. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499 (2001).
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When a dismissal without prejudice is warranted under the standard
balancing test, these courts should allow the plaintiff to dismiss her claim
without prejudice so she can refile it in a jurisdiction where a longer statute
of limitations will apply. When a dismissal without prejudice is not
warranted under the standard balancing test, courts should dismiss the
action with prejudice, not on statute-of-limitations grounds.169
Recall in Phillips, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant’s loss of a
statute-of-limitations defense constitutes per se legal prejudice sufficient to
bar dismissal without prejudice.170 The court emphasized that a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice would cause the defendant to lose an absolute
defense.171 The court overlooked the fact that statute-of-limitations
dismissals are not claim preclusive in Louisiana, where the action
originated.172 In other words, a statute-of-limitations defense is not an
absolute defense in Louisiana. This holding is misleading because it is
based on the faulty premise that dismissals on statute-of-limitations grounds
are always claim preclusive. It assumes that a statute-of-limitations defense
provides defendants with an absolute defense to liability. The plaintiff
could have refiled his claim in another jurisdictions despite the court’s
dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds.173 But the language and
reasoning in the opinion misled the plaintiff to believe his claim was
extinguished. This decision is similarly inefficient because if the plaintiff
does refile the action in another jurisdiction, the defendant has no protection
from duplicative costs and efforts.174
This flawed reasoning has developed bad precedent in jurisdictions
where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive. These
courts fail to adequately balance the interests of the parties.
CONCLUSION
The voluntary dismissal analysis should account for the individual
circumstances of each case. When a plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss a
time-barred claim without prejudice to refile it in another jurisdiction, a
court must consider the impact such action would have on the defendant’s
interests. A court cannot do so without resolving what it means for a
defendant to lose the ability to assert a statute-of-limitations defense in a
subsequent lawsuit. Courts can make this determination by resolving
whether a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim preclusive under
the applicable state law. This determines whether the loss of a statute-oflimitations defense would substantially harm the defendant’s interests and,
169. A dismissal with prejudice will preclude the plaintiff from refiling the action, while a
statute-of-limitations dismissal will not.
170. See Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1989).
171. See id.
172. See Griffin v. BSFI W. E & P, Inc., 812 So. 2d 726, 731–32 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
173. See supra Part III.A.1; see also Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499 (explaining that in a
jurisdiction where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive, a defendant
remains subject to liability in another jurisdiction even if the court purports to dismiss a
claim on statute-of-limitations grounds “in [its] entirety on the merits and with prejudice”).
174. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
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thus, whether the court should proceed with a bright-line rule or balancing
test.
In jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim
preclusive, the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense does not substantially
impact the defendant’s interests. In these jurisdictions, courts should allow
a plaintiff to dismiss a claim without prejudice so long as other factors
weigh in favor of doing so. By contrast, in jurisdictions where statute-oflimitations dismissals are claim preclusive, the loss of a statute-oflimitations defense substantially impairs a defendant’s interests. In these
jurisdictions, courts should not allow a plaintiff to dismiss a claim without
prejudice. Instead, they should enter judgment for the defendant by either
dismissing the action with prejudice or dismissing the claim on statute-oflimitations grounds. Such a framework would help to alleviate the
inefficiencies perpetuated by the current approaches courts use to resolve
motions for voluntary dismissal of time-barred claims.

